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Abstract 
Companies increasingly extend their outsourcing strategies from single-sourcing to 
multisourcing combining best-of-breed vendors. This paper includes an analytical 
model to evaluate a company’s multisourcing strategy. The model can be applied for 
decision support to answer the questions, how many and which outsourcing vendors to 
integrate in the implementation of an IT project. We identify an optimal vendor 
portfolio considering monetary benefits and risk diversification as well as transaction 
costs arising from the integration and coordination of outsourcing vendors. Based upon 
a simulation, we find that it makes good economic sense to include a risk evaluation into 
the multisourcing decision process even if it is subject to misestimation. Therewith, 
companies are able to avoid unnecessary high risk and consequently a possible high 
damage. Furthermore, we find that it is better to be too cautious in risk assessment than 
to be too negligent. 
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Introduction 
According to Dibbern et al. (2004) firms pursue outsourcing strategies to reduce costs and mitigate risks 
associated with their business processes. Increased competition forces companies to deal with the cost 
cutting which is necessary to stay in business. Therefore, the market for outsourcing services increased 
significantly over time and is about to outgrow previous prospects (Aspray et al. 2006). IT outsourcing 
vendors benefit from this development and become more specialized and competitive (Lacity et al. 2009). 
This provides the opportunity for companies to close more profitable outsourcing deals with vendors that 
are experts in the respective area. Especially software development projects are affected, in consideration 
of the fact that today software development skills are global commodities (Dutta and Roy 2005; Lacity 
and Willcocks 2003). It is of particular importance for companies to identify a profitable software 
development outsourcing strategy, which encompasses not only strategic, but also economic and social 
perspectives (Lee et al. 2003). For the time being, in the majority of companies, a viable outsourcing 
strategy is either unknown or difficult to determine, because project evaluation processes are neither 
specified nor documented. Therefore, many companies struggle with the execution of an integrative 
outsourcing strategy and still have difficulties to succeed in the implementation of IT projects. On the 
contrary, Sauer et al. (2007) illustrate, when project risks are managed by a capable team, follow 
reasonable plans and tactics, and are of a manageable size, the outcomes are far better. To meet the 
desired requirement of managing an IT project profitably, multisourcing evolves as a capable strategy 
(Cohen and Young 2006; Levina and Su 2008; Oshri et al. 2009). The principal reasons for multisourcing 
from a client’s perspective are increased bargaining power and better performance of the vendors (Lee et 
al. 2009). 
Bapna et al. (2010) examine the dependencies of multiple vendors who are competitors and co-workers at 
the same time. All vendors who participate in the same project have to rely on each other’s performance to 
meet the client’s requirements. Little research has addressed this increased complexity. The authors 
demonstrate that „linear extensions of dyadic client-vendor IT outsourcing relationships are insufficient 
to capture the nuances of a multisourcing environment.” They point out that further research shall 
address the characteristics of multi-vendor relations. As a first step, we examine a multisourcing strategy 
from a client’s perspective and provide a model that helps the client to render multi-vendor IT 
outsourcing decisions. 
The selection of IT outsourcing vendors is rarely conducted using quantitative methods and it is rarely 
taking cost, benefits, and risk into account. Especially a comprehensive risk assessment is still very scarce 
although multisourcing can offer important advantages in this respect. Sourcing IT to a single vendor 
might lower costs of coordination but the client “puts all eggs into one basket”. This is fraught with 
problems when it comes to a poor performance or even default of the chosen vendor. Furthermore, 
considering the complex dependencies within every IT project (Kundisch and Meier 2011) an unfortunate 
allocation of a single vendor to several essential subprojects can bear extreme risk for the project as a 
whole. 
As today's decision makers oftentimes neglect the assessment of risk, it is very difficult to acquire data for 
an empirical evaluation. Especially the comparison of the respective projects' success and the used 
methods of risk assessment is demanding. Though, to generate further insights, we developed a formal 
deductive economic model to provide an understanding of the importance of risk assessment in the 
multisourcing decision process. A common reason for neglecting risk is the fact that the estimation of risk 
is often prone to error and requires a considerable amount of time and money. Regarding the vendor 
selection process, we illustrate that even if risk is assessed with a substantial estimation error, much 
better project outcomes can be achieved than in a scenario without risk assessment. 
From a practitioner’s point of view, the model enables companies to improve their multisourcing strategy 
in an economic sense by considering costs, benefits, and risk of the decision. Our model shall not serve as 
a substitute for existing selection processes (see e.g. Cao and Wang 2007; Michell and Fitzgerald 1997; 
Wadhwa and Ravindran 2007) but it might do so as a complementary tool for decision support. As 
drawing normative conclusions from our model requires empirical evaluation, the data gathered from its 
application may be used to empirically evaluate its utility in the future. 
Considering the aforementioned insights from research in multisourcing, transaction cost, and portfolio 
theory we pose the following research questions: 
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1. Given a set of outsourcing vendors what is the optimal multi-vendor IT outsourcing strategy from 
a client’s perspective, i.e. which vendor should conduct which subproject? 
2. How does the assessment of risk affect this decision? How substantial is the error when 
neglecting risk? 
To the best of our knowledge there are no scientific papers addressing a quantitative portfolio selection as 
well as the importance of risk assessment in multi-vendor IT outsourcing. 
Subsequent to a brief survey of the essential literature, we describe the basic setting and assumptions of 
our model. The risk-adjusted net present value of a project constitutes our objective function. We derive 
first results by the means of an analytical two subproject example. Then, we use a Monte Carlo simulation 
and identify the best multi-vendor IT outsourcing solutions. After describing the simulation framework, 
we evaluate and discuss the robustness of our model. To conclude, we derive results and address practical 
implications, limitations and prospects of our model. 
Literature Overview 
IT outsourcing is defined as the decision on relocating an IT department’s tasks to a third party vendor, 
who conducts them and charges a certain fee for the service (Apte et al. 1997; Lacity and Hirschheim 
1993; Loh and Venkatraman 1992). The reasons for IT outsourcing are manifold, e.g. Di Romualdo and 
Gurbaxani (1998) identified three strategic intents for IT outsourcing, in particular IS improvement, 
business impact, and commercial exploitation. But the main motive is the cost advantage outsourcing 
bears, if implemented appropriately (Dibbern et al. 2004; Lacity and Willcocks 1998). To succeed in the 
implementation, firms need a strategy to manage the costs, benefits and risks of outsourcing decisions 
(Nault 1997; Willcocks et al. 1999). An integrated view of outsourcing, containing strategic, economic and 
social aspects, helps firms to realize the anticipated gains (Lee et al. 2003). In the past fifteen years, 
instead of closing “outsourcing megadeals” selective outsourcing evolved, where companies decide 
deliberately on their outsourcing activities (Lacity et al. 1996). Aron et al. (2005) coin the term 
“rightsourcing”, which means that a conscious risk and relationship management with multiple 
outsourcing vendors enables companies to reap benefits. Therewith, outsourcing clients are able to 
combine the best-of-breed vendors to implement their IT strategy optimally (Bapna et al. 2010). 
Furthermore, developments in integration technologies lead to lower costs of technical integration and 
coordination, which facilitates the collaboration of numerous parties (Moitra and Ganesh 2005). 
Besides the benefits, drawbacks have to be taken into account, when deciding on outsourcing (Dewan et 
al. 2007). Outsourcing can entail disadvantages like unauthorized knowledge transfer, inflexibility though 
long term contracts, poor relationship management and accompanying poor loyalty and quality (Bryce 
and Useem 1998). Also the choice of the outsourcing contract is relevant for outsourcing failure or success 
(Gopal et al. 2003; Susarla et al. 2010). Therefore, risk factors must be included into the evaluation of 
outsourcing decisions. Since the formerly mostly dyadic relationships of client and vendor evolved to 
complex relationships of client and multiple vendors, which implies dependencies on mutual performance 
and willingness of collaboration (Bapna et al. 2010; Cohen and Young 2006; Levina and Su 2008), 
interdependencies have to be considered when determining an IT project’s risk. Many articles focus on 
the qualitative assessment of risk, for example Aron et al. (2005) and Willcocks et al. (1999), whereas few 
focus on the quantification and computation of risk, like Aubert et al. (1999). Due to the increased 
professionalism of outsourcing service providers there is a high potential of saving development time and 
cost reduction. When multi-vendor outsourcing is implemented appropriately, the specific risks of IT, 
such as project failure, time over-run, budget over-run and missing targets could be diminished. 
In addition to the risky costs and benefits of development, transaction costs occur, if a project is 
outsourced to a vendor (Aubert et al. 2004; Lammers 2004). Transaction costs can be split into fixed and 
variable components, whereas fixed transaction costs occur as soon as certain projects or fractions of a 
project are outsourced, for example costs of negotiation and project initiation (Patel and Subrahmanyam 
1982). Variable transaction costs depend on the magnitude of the fraction or project outsourced, e.g. costs 
of communication and control (Dibbern et al. 2006). For a brief survey of transaction cost economics and 
“extra cost” evolving from client vendor relationships in the context of outsourcing see Dibbern et al. 
(2008). 
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Today, firms are trying to establish a comprehensive IT portfolio management, in order to get the most 
advantageous rates of risk and return (Oh et al. 2007; Weill and Aral 2005). Therefore, many papers 
address the issue of how to govern an IT project portfolio. Quantitative approaches on IT portfolio 
management, e.g. Verhoef (2005), work with economic theory such as the discounted cash flow but 
mostly omit interdependencies between projects. Some approaches model interdependencies by using 
portfolio theory (Butler et al. 1999; Santhanam and Kyparisis 1996). Zimmermann et al. (2008) for 
example adapt portfolio theory to propose a decision model for global IT sourcing decisions. They 
consider the costs of site and project combinations as risky and build a portfolio optimization model. 
Approaches which apply portfolio selection methods on multi-vendor IT outsourcing are scarce and 
mostly focus on programming issues like Chen and Cao (2009). 
Similar to most of the aforementioned articles, our model does not consider the risk of outsourcing in its 
entirety (e.g. qualitative vs. quantitative risk, risk of costs vs. returns). We focus on risk as estimated and 
computable variations of the net present values of IT (sub-) projects. Using this abstraction we are able to 
provide an economic model that delivers relevant insights supporting the design of outsourcing decision 
processes in today’s businesses. 
Model 
Our focus is the analysis of a situation where an outsourcing client wants to optimize the IT outsourcing 
strategy considering multiple vendors. Therefore, we look at a set of outsourcing vendors ܸ, ݒ denoting an 
element of ܸ. The project at hand consists of indivisible, consecutively numbered subprojects ݏ ൌ 1. . ܵ 
which are all obligatory for the project’s success. Without loss of generality, each subproject is assignable 
to any of the outsourcing vendors in ܸ. The model is also capable of picturing in-house development; if a 
subproject is developed internally the client is modeled as one of the service providers. 
We define the row vector ݒറ ∈ ܸௌ as our decision vector. The column ݏ of ݒറ contains the selected vendor for 
subproject ݏ. We define the function ݒሺݏሻ to return the selected vendor for any subproject ݏ. We model a 
subproject’s net present value ܰܲ෫ܸ௦,௩  as a random variable depending on the respective outsourcing 
vendor. 
By using the expected net present value and its standard deviation, we are able to capture all IT-specific 
risks albeit on an abstract level. The risk of budget overruns directly influences the amount of the cash 
outflows and can therefore be modeled by the standard deviation. Time overruns lead to delays in cash 
inflows. Even if a project fails or misses its targets cash out- and inflows vary accordingly. As over-
estimating the required time or budget is also unfavorable, a two-sided risk measure like the standard 
deviation is applicable. Therefore, all kinds of IT specific risks are taken into account by considering a 
projects’ ܰܲ෫ܸ௦,௩. 
Regarding the decision on vendors for subprojects ݒറ considering every subprojects’ ܰܲ෫ܸ௦,௩, we make the 
following assumption 1: 
Assumption 1: The decision maker maximizes the entire project’s risk adjusted net present 
value. The calculation of the risk adjusted net present value follows the general structure Ф ൌ ߤ െ ߙߪଶ. ߤ 
denotes the expected net present value; ߪଶ denotes its variance as a measure of risk. We define ߙ as the 
parameter of risk aversion and assume that the decision maker is risk-averse (ߙ ൐ 0). The correlation 
between subprojects is depicted by the Bravais-Pearson correlation coefficients ߩ௦,௩,௦ሶ,௩ሶ  for the respective 
subprojects ݏ and ݏሶ as well as vendors ݒ and ݒሶ . 
The risk adjusted net present value can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of ܰܲ෫ܸ௦,௩ for normally 
distributed random variables and an exponential utility function and thus as a sum of money. This 
approach is in line with the Bernoulli principle and an established method of decision theory (Bernoulli 
1738; Bernoulli 1954; Markowitz 1959; von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947). The parameter α ൐ 0 is a 
linear transformation of the Arrow-Pratt characterization of absolute risk aversion (Arrow 1971). The 
higher the value of	α, the more risk-averse is the decision maker. A risk-averse decision maker favors the 
utility of a risk-free net present value over a risky net present value with identical expected value. To 
determine the value of ߙ, a company can draw on a market’s utility function (competitors etc.) and thereof 
derive ߙ (Kasanen and Trigeorgis 1994). Similar formal approaches and assumptions for risk adjusted 
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economic value analysis have been derived by Longley-Cook (1998) and have been applied in the context 
of IT portfolios numerous times, for example in Bardhan et al. (2004), Fridgen and Müller (2009), 
Hanink (1985), Fogelstroሷm et al. (2010), and Zimmermann et al. (2008). 
As described above, outsourcing one or more subprojects to a certain vendor causes fixed and variable 
transaction costs. Assuming the variable transaction costs to be part of the respective ܰܲ෫ܸ௦,௩, we account 
for the fixed transaction costs by the following simplifying assumption 2: 
Assumption 2: Each outsourcing vendor ݒ conducting at least one subproject causes risk-free 
transaction costs ݇௩ . The function ܭሺݒറሻ  returns the sum of the transaction costs ݇௩  for all distinct 
components of ݒറ. 
There might be real world situations where certain combinations of vendor and subproject are not 
practicable. For instance, a small company specialized on user-friendly front-end design is most probably 
not able to setup a complex database infrastructure. This issue can be covered by our model and the 
respective optimization algorithms through assuming prohibiting (e.g. infinite) values for the respective 
ߤ௦,௩ and ߪ௦,௩. 
Objective Function 
A project’s risk adjusted ܰܲ෫ܸ௦,௩ minus transaction costs constitutes the objective function which is to be 










With having a decision vector instead of a single decision variable, the model can be solved analytically for 
small problems only. This is due to the fact that all subproject-vendor combinations have to be analyzed 
and compared to each other individually. For example, with 4 subprojects and 5 vendors, 5ସ ൌ 625	 
different cases arise. Therefore, a full enumeration demands for computerized support. As real-world 
multi-vendor portfolio selection problems will be of a magnitude that can be handled by computers within 
seconds, a computer-aided full enumeration usually will be preferred to applying heuristics. 
Model Evaluation 
As described above, in today’s companies a risk assessment, as requested by our model, is difficult to find. 
Consequently, at this point in time it is virtually impossible to acquire real world data to examine the 
benefits of risk assessment profoundly. However, as stated in the following, considerable advantages can 
be realized by applying the model. Therefore, companies might adopt it and a real world evaluation using 
case or field studies will be possible in the future. 
According to Hevner et al.’s (2004) design science approach, an analytical evaluation or gathering data by 
simulation are legitimate means. For illustration and to derive first results for the mathematically 
interested reader, in a first step we analyze the setting of an IT project consisting of only two subprojects 
offered by two vendors analytically. Due to the model’s complexity when applied on larger problems, an 
analytical evaluation is not auspicious. In a second step, for more complex project settings, we present 
and analyze the results of a Monte Carlo simulation. 
Analytical Evaluation: Two Vendors and Two Subprojects 
In the following, we examine the setting of an IT project consisting of two subprojects (ܵ ൌ 2) offered by 
two vendors (ܸ ൌ ሼܣ, ܤሽ). Consequently, ݒറ may contain four different tuples: 
 ݒറ ൌ ሺܣ, ܣሻ, i.e. both subprojects are conducted by vendor ܣ 
 ݒറ ൌ ሺܤ, ܤሻ, i.e. both subprojects are conducted by vendor ܤ 
 ݒറ ൌ ሺܣ, ܤሻ, i.e. the first subproject is conducted by vendor ܣ, the second by ܤ 
 ݒറ ൌ ሺܤ, ܣሻ, i.e. the first subproject is conducted by vendor ܤ, the second by ܣ 
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For an optimization, it is necessary to compare the results of the objective functions Фሺሺܣ, ܣሻሻ, Фሺሺܤ, ܤሻሻ, 
Фሺሺܣ, ܤሻሻ, Фሺሺܤ, ܣሻሻ and identify the ݒറ with the maximum Фሺݒറሻ. Therefore, we consider 
Ф൫ሺܣ, ܣሻ൯ ൌ ߤଵ,஺ ൅ ߤଶ,஺ െ ߙ൫ߪଵ,஺ଶ ൅ ߪଶ,஺ଶ ൅ 2ߪଵ,஺ߪଶ,஺ߩଵ,஺,ଶ,஺൯ െ ݇஺,	
Ф൫ሺܤ, ܤሻ൯ ൌ ߤଵ,஻ ൅ ߤଶ,஻ െ ߙ൫ߪଵ,஻ଶ ൅ ߪଶ,஻ଶ ൅ 2ߪଵ,஻ߪଶ,஻ߩଵ,஻,ଶ,஻൯ െ ݇஻,	
Ф൫ሺܣ, ܤሻ൯ ൌ ߤଵ,஺ ൅ ߤଶ,஻ െ ߙ൫ߪଵ,஺ଶ ൅ ߪଶ,஻ଶ ൅ 2ߪଵ,஺ߪଶ,஻ߩଵ,஺,ଶ,஻൯ െ ݇஺ െ ݇஻,	
Фሺሺܤ, ܣሻሻ ൌ ߤଵ,஻ ൅ ߤଶ,஺ െ ߙ൫ߪଵ,஻ଶ ൅ ߪଶ,஺ଶ ൅ 2ߪଵ,஻ߪଶ,஺ߩଵ,஻,ଶ,஺൯ െ ݇஻ െ ݇஺. 
According to our research question, it is of particular interest, under which conditions the client favors the 
multiple vendors solutions ሺܣ, ܤሻ  or ሺܤ, ܣሻ  over the single vendor solutions ሺܣ, ܣሻ  and ሺܤ, ܤሻ . In our 
illustration ܣ and ܤ are interchangeable without loss of generality. Hence, we focus on one representative 
comparison: 
Ф൫ሺܣ, ܤሻ൯ ൐ Ф൫ሺܣ, ܣሻ൯	
⇔ ൫ߤଶ,஻ െ ߤଶ,஺൯ െ ݇஻ െ ߙ ቀ൫ߪଶ,஻ଶ െ ߪଶ,஺ଶ ൯ ൅ 2൫ߪଵ,஺ߪଶ,஻ߩଵ,஺,ଶ,஻ െ ߪଵ,஺ߪଶ,஺ߩଵ,஺,ଶ,஺൯ቁ ൐ 0 
Since in this example the first subproject is conducted by ܣ in either option, the expected net present 
value of the second subproject might be critical for either a single vendor or multiple vendor strategy. It 
therefore is an advantage for ሺܣ, ܤሻ if ߤଶ,஻ ൐ ߤଶ,஺ and a disadvantage if ߤଶ,஻ ൏ ߤଶ,஺. Choosing ሺܣ, ܤሻ instead 
of ሺܣ, ܣሻ causes additional transaction costs ݇஻ which is a downside of multisourcing. 
Risk has to be examined in more detail: First, we look at the respective values of the variance as our 
measure of risk. ߪଶ,஻ଶ ൏ ߪଶ,஺ଶ  (ܤ delivering the second subproject at a lower risk than ܣ) is an advantage for 
ሺܣ, ܤሻ, analogous ߪଶ,஻ଶ ൐ ߪଶ,஺ଶ  is a disadvantage. Second, we examine the dependencies between the two 
subprojects depicted by the respective covariances ߪଵ,஺ߪଶ,஻ߩଵ,஺,ଶ,஻  and ߪଵ,஺ߪଶ,஺ߩଵ,஺,ଶ,஺ . Depending on the 
values of the standard deviations ߪଶ,஻, ߪଶ,஺ and the correlation coefficients ߩଵ,஺,ଶ,஻, ߩଵ,஺,ଶ,஺, those can be an 
advantage or disadvantage for ሺܣ, ܤሻ. 
In reality, however, we will find that subprojects conducted by different vendors feature lower 
dependencies than subprojects conducted by the same vendor. This can be explained by vendor specific 
risk, e.g. unexpected low performance of a single vendor. Consequently, in a real-world setting we can 
expect that ߩଵ,஺,ଶ,஻ ൏ ߩଵ,஺,ଶ,஺. As long as this effect is not outweighed by a high standard deviation ߪଶ,஻ 
compared to a lower ߪଶ,஺, multisourcing bears the opportunity of risk diversification. 
Altogether, we can state that the decision on multisourcing heavily depends on the respective values of the 
different variables. Especially risk can be an aspect in favor of or against multisourcing and neglecting risk 
can lead to a different decision outcome. In the following sections we analyze in more detail what 
consequences neglecting risk might lead to. 
Evaluation based on a Monte Carlo Simulation 
The problem at hand is very complex, as it requires a full enumeration for each project setting to derive 
the respective optimal vendor selection. Consequently, a sensitivity analysis cannot be conducted 
analytically for large project settings. We chose the Monte Carlo method as it permits the processing of 
complex problems within reasonable time and derives results based on the law of large numbers. Using a 
Monte Carlo simulation, we can treat the full enumeration as a black box and implement a sensitivity 
analysis by running the simulation with original and slightly adapted input parameters. Lacking real 
world data, we furthermore need to create those project settings assuming realistic distributions for our 
input parameters. This way, we are able to confirm effects identified during the analytical evaluation for a 
very small project setting or to identify effects which occur in large project settings only. 
We generated 1000 different project settings. Each project consists of 6 subprojects each of which is 
conducted by one of 7 vendors. The following table 1 shows the respective ranges of the input data for the 
simulation of a single project setting. In this context, the term “vendor specificity” means that for each 
subproject a basic expected net present value and standard deviation were created randomly within the 
given range and then varied for each individual vendor. For reasons of simplicity we speak of ߤ, ߪ, ߷, and 
݇ in the following, meaning all expected values, standard deviations, correlations, and transaction costs, 
respectively, for all subprojects and vendors. 
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Table 1. Monte Carlo input data 
 Range Distribution 
Expected net present value of 
each subproject (ߤ) 10,000 – 100,000 equal 
vendor specificity  gaussian (±10 %) 
Standard deviation of each 
subproject (ߪ) 
0 – 20% 
of subproject’s net present value equal 
vendor specificity  gaussian (±10 %) 
Transaction costs of each 
vendor (݇) 20,000 (mean) gaussian (±25 %) 
Parameter of risk aversion (ߙ) 5·10-5 – 15·10-5 equal 
Correlations (߷) for subprojects 
outsourced to the same vendor 0.0 – 0.8 gaussian (mean: 0.4) 
Correlations (߷) for subprojects 
outsourced to different vendors 0.0 – 0.8 gaussian (mean: 0.2) 
For each project setting, we identified the vendor selection ݒറ that maximizes Фሺݒറሻ, the value of Фሺݒറሻ, and 
how many different vendors are components of the vendor portfolio described by ݒറ.  
To conduct the sensitivity analysis, we furthermore generated comparative scenarios by varying the input 
parameters listed below individually by -50%, -25%, -5%, -1%, +1%, +5%, +25%, and +50%. 
 Parameter of risk aversion (ߙ) 
 Expected net present values (ߤ) 
 Standard deviations (ߪ) 
 Correlations (߷) 
 Transaction costs (݇) 
Defining ݒറ′ as the decision vector of a comparative scenario and Ф′ as value of the comparative objective 
function, we identified for each project, which vendor selection ݒറ′ maximizes Ф′ሺݒറ′ሻ. For comparison we 
furthermore evaluated, in how many positions the comparative vendor selection ݒറ′  differs from the 
optimal vendor selection ݒറ and by what amount the initial objective function differs when inserting the 
initial and comparative selection respectively: Фሺݒറሻ െ Фሺݒറ′ሻ, i.e. we determined the monetary damage the 
variation of the input parameter causes in reference to the initial objective function. 
The damage can be interpreted as follows: With Ф based upon “accurate” values and Ф′ based upon an 
erroneous estimation, the damage measures the difference of the value of the initial objective function Ф 
with different input vectors: on the one hand the optimal selection ݒറ  and on the other the “wrong” 
selection ݒറ′. As Фሺݒറሻ is optimal and as Фሺݒറ′ሻ is suboptimal, we can conclude that the damage is always 
greater than or equal to zero. Interpreting Фሺݒറሻ and Фሺݒറ′ሻ as certainty equivalents (amounts of money), 
the damage can be interpreted as an amount of money, too. 
Model Robustness 
Appendix I contains the list of average results derived from 1000 Monte Carlo runs. It shows the 
respective input parameter that is varied to generate the comparative scenario (column 1) and the 
respective rates of change (column 2). The third column lists the average number of differences in the 
portfolio composition, i.e. the different vendor selection of the initial and the comparative scenarios. The 
fourth column contains the average absolute damage concerning the risk adjusted net present value of the 
project resulting from the variation. In order to provide a more generally interpretable measure of the 
consequences of the variation, the fifth column lists the relative damage based upon the average project 
net present value of 3,153,415.13 which was calculated from all project settings generated by the Monte 
Carlo simulation. The analysis of the data implies four interesting findings: 
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1. According to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test, there is a statistically significant difference in the 
medians of Фሺݒറሻ and Фሺݒറ′ሻ despite one exception (transaction costs varied by +1%, fourth from 
last row). This means, that for all other parameters even an erroneous estimation of only ±1% 
leads to a statistical significant damage. 
2. Surprisingly, the damage is very small: Even with an estimation error of +50%, for the standard 
deviation the relative damage stays below 5%. For all other parameters estimation errors between 
±50% lead to relative damages below 1.5%.  
3. Despite the above mentioned low average and relative damage, the portfolio composition shows 
remarkable changes. The composition of the vendor portfolio alters up to an average of 2,57 
positions (standard deviations varied by -50%, row 17) for a certain variation, due to the 
misestimation. 
4. Overestimating the input parameters of the objective function causes less damage concerning the 
risk adjusted net present value of the project than underestimating them. Concerning research 
question 2, this is especially interesting for the parameters modeling risk (ߙ, ߪ, and ߷). Obviously, 
it causes less damage to be too cautious in risk assessment, than to be too negligent. 
In summary it can be stated, that assessing risk not only is of utmost importance, but also the model 
elaborated above is very robust in regard to estimation errors. 
On the importance of risk assessment 
Neglecting risk, a decision maker decides on a multi-vendor IT outsourcing portfolio only by evaluating 
whether increased expected net present values due to specialization of certain providers are outweighed 
by the respective transaction costs. In our model this exact situation can be produced by setting ߙ and/or 
ߪ equal to zero (zeroizing the parameter of risk aversion ߙ and all standard deviations ߪ has the exact 
same effect as they are multiplicatively linked). 
The robustness of the model elaborated above, exposed a limited sensitivity regarding the variation of 
individual parameters even by ±50%. This finding might lead to the presumption, that neglecting risk (i.e. 
varying ߙ and/or ߪ by -100%) would also lead to minor damage concerning the risk adjusted net present 
value of the project. 
To scrutinize this presumption, we evaluated a comparative scenario setting the parameter of risk 
aversion ߙ equal to zero. Therewith, risk is not taken into account when indentifying the optimal vendor 
portfolio selection of a project. We get the values as depicted in table 2. 
Table 2. Consequences of neglecting risk 
 Estimation error Average # of 
differences in 
vendor selections 
Average damage Relative damage 
Parameter of risk 
aversion (ߙ) -100% 3.844 1323578.528 41.973% 
According to table 2, the damage from neglecting risk exceeds the damage from overestimating or 
underestimating risk tremendously. Considering the comparative scenarios listed in appendix I, 
underestimating the standard deviations by 50% has the highest impact. It leads to an average of 2.57 
subprojects assigned to different vendors and to a relative damage of less than 5%. Neglecting risk leads to 
an average of nearly 4 subprojects (⅔ of the entire project’s components) assigned to different vendors 
and to a relative damage of more than 40%. 
This investigation also suggests the presumption that there is a positive correlation between the number 
of differences in vendor selection and the resulting damage. While this might seem trivial on first sight, it 
is not necessarily a predicate of portfolio selection. Completely different portfolios can still feature similar 
risk-adjusted net present values. We tested our dataset for this correlation and found that the damage 
when neglecting risk is indeed positively correlated to the number of differences in portfolio selection with 
a correlation coefficient of 0.397 (significant at the 0.01 level). 
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As a consequence we can state that risk assessment based upon an erroneous estimation still leads to 
much better results than neglecting risk completely whereupon the resulting damage is substantial. We 
would therefore strongly recommend practitioners to integrate the assessment of risk and dependencies 
into their vendor selection processes. As a first step, our model could be used and adapted for decision 
support. 
Practical Implications, Limitations and Conclusion 
Today’s businesses usually omit a quantitative risk assessment when deciding on multi-vendor IT 
outsourcing. Some do extend their focus from a pure cash-flow oriented view to a more generic one and 
integrate risk and dependencies into their decisions. Nevertheless, these approaches are often pragmatic 
and methodically weak. The vision of a value adding quantitative IT portfolio management in the context 
of multi-vendor IT outsourcing requires methodically rigor models that deliver initial reasonable results, 
although they might not be suitable to be applied in practice without some company-specific adjustments. 
Although it bears great potential of economic improvement, still little quantitative research exists in the 
field of multi-vendor IT outsourcing. Therefore, this paper not only presents an analytical model to 
allocate vendors to subprojects in an optimal way, accounting for expected net present values, risk, 
transaction costs, and dependencies between subprojects conducted by either the same or different 
vendors (research question 1). But also, this contribution illustrates the importance of risk assessment 
within multi-vendor IT outsourcing decisions using a Monte Carlo simulation. The model is quite robust 
in terms of estimation errors. It shows that optimizing the allocation of vendors and neglecting risk 
completely causes significantly higher damage (research question 2). Moreover, the approach shows that 
overestimating the model’s parameters seems to have a smaller impact than underestimating them. 
Altogether, we can derive the following implications for management from this paper: 
a) When allocating multiple vendors to a project, it makes good economic sense to include a risk 
evaluation into the decision process. 
b) An erroneous estimation of risk and the corresponding interdependencies is might still be better 
than neglecting risk completely. 
c) Make conservative estimations regarding risk: Overestimating standard deviations and 
correlations causes less damage than underestimating them. 
One aspect which is not covered by this paper is the following: The main reason for omitting a profound 
risk assessment in today’s companies is most likely the fact, that risk assessment is a complex task which 
incurs a decent amount of time and money itself. This raises further research questions which we might 
address in future contributions, e.g. questions about an economical optimal degree of estimation accuracy 
in risk assessment. Nevertheless, according to our management implication b) it is economically 
reasonable to include at least some sort of risk assessment in the evaluation process of multi-vendor 
outsourcing. 
Considering limitations of our findings, one has to mention that the model’s inherent interpretation of 
risk is rather abstract. That means our model is limited to deal with quantifiable and attributable 
components of risk, only. When applying our model, risk factors that are hard to quantify (e.g. cultural 
aspects) have to be either neglected or converted into quantitative figures by using appropriate methods. 
Furthermore, our model pictures dependencies within one project only. The development of an integrated 
model considering the existing outsourcing vendor and project portfolios as well as the decision on 
additional vendors and projects might be of great significance to practitioners as well as to researchers.  
Although the model pictures reality in a slightly constrained way, it provides a basis for firms to plan and 
improve their multi-vendor outsourcing strategies. Moreover, it is a theoretically sound economical 
approach which allows further development and delivers insights in the assessment of risk. 
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Appendix I 
 Estimation error Average # of 
differences in 
vendor selections 
Average damage Relative damage 
Parameter of risk 
aversion (ߙ) 
-50% 1.556 32949.93 1.045% 
-25% 0.676 4454.25 0.141% 
-5% 0.125 164.75 0.005% 
-1% 0.025 7.22 0.000% 
+1% 0.03 6.99 0.000% 
+5% 0.104 115.23 0.004% 
+25% 0.531 2510.68 0.080% 
+50% 0.888 7414.73 0.235% 
Expected net 
present values (ߤ) 
-50% 1.315 18478.94 0.586% 
-25% 0.658 3974.87 0.126% 
-5% 0.133 173.99 0.006% 
-1% 0.029 5.84 0.000% 
+1% 0.024 7.00 0.000% 
+5% 0.122 134.30 0.004% 
+25% 0.532 2623.37 0.083% 
+50% 0.934 9814.07 0.311% 
Standard 
deviations (ߪ) 
-50% 2.57 152203.91 4.827% 
-25% 1.301 21928.34 0.695% 
-5% 0.251 580.96 0.018% 
-1% 0.039 16.14 0.001% 
+1% 0.042 12.10 0.000% 
+5% 0.259 501.51 0.016% 
+25% 0.924 8211.75 0.260% 
+50% 1.498 24762.58 0.785% 
Correlations (߷) -50% 1.382 35792.81 1.135% 
-25% 0.665 6136.45 0.195% 
-5% 0.096 130.15 0.004% 
-1% 0.026 7.96 0.000% 
+1% 0.023 3.64 0.000% 
+5% 0.105 151.21 0.005% 
+25% 0.538 3566.84 0.113% 
+50% 0.962 11266.05 0.357% 
Transaction costs 
(݇) 
-50% 0.437 1934.62 0.061% 
-25% 0.198 418.17 0.013% 
-5% 0.047 21.07 0.001% 
-1%* 0.006 0.65 0.000% 
+1%** 0.001 0.07 0.000% 
+5% 0.029 8.17 0.000% 
+25% 0.175 342.30 0.011% 
+50% 0.307 1079.04 0.034% 
* Median of Ф is different with a significance at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Median of Ф is different with a significance of 0.317 (2-tailed). 
All other medians of Ф are different with a significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
